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INTRODUCTION
Commentators have, for some years, drawn attention to the social and economic ills that could arise from over-urbanization in developing countries (Gugler, 1988) . These forebodings appeared premature in the 1970s when cities in many parts of the developing world grew economically, and when the benefits of this growth trickled down even to the poorest urban inhabitants (Roberts, 1978; Gregory, 1986) . I suspect that this period of optimism is now over, and in this paper, I explore the possibility that urbanization in developing countries now, at last, faces its crisis. Such forecasting is risky since current difficulties may prove short term, but I wish to raise certain research and policy issues that have been overlooked by stressing the continuities with the past. promoted industrialization through tariffs and subsidies, with the aim of supplying the domestic market and reducing dependency on the export of primary products.
By limiting myself to Latin America, I will not be able to take proper account of the diversity of patterns of contemporary urbanization in developing countries. This diversity is linked, in part, to differences in the histories of their integration into the world system. Other developing countries have been, for instance, less committed to ISI, resulting in marked differences in timing and levels of urbanization. In the first section, therefore, I consider briefly the diversity of patterns of urbanization in developing countries, suggesting ways in which these differences are likely to affect their "responses" to the new order.
I will then consider some of the contributions made by world system theory to understanding urbanization in developed and developing countries (which, following that theory's convention, will be called core and noncore3). Drawing in a general way on these insights, I will look at the current spatial restructuring of urban systems in noncore countries, and at the changes in patterns of migration, in labor markets, and urban social organization.
THE PATTERN OF URBANIZATION IN NONCORE COUNTRIES
My aim in this section is to show the diversity of patterns of urbanization in noncore countries. I also explore, in a very preliminary way, the factors that account for this diversity and that are likely to temper the impact of the new economic order on noncore countries.
The classifications I use are based on contrasts in the timing and mode of incorporation into the world economy. These two variables provide a preliminary understanding of the key historical experiences affecting urbanization, particularly varieties of agrarian transformation. Five types of incorporation can be identified from among the geographical groupings in Table I , although they are purely suggestive, needing further analysis at the level of individual countries to assess variations in timing and mode of incorporation.
The first type includes those areas that were incorporated earliest and through the most radical restructuring of rural social relationships and show the highest levels of urbanization, and initially high but declining rates of urbanization, namely the various areas of Latin America (see Table I ).
3The distinctions developed by world system theory are between core, semiperiphery, and periphery (Kentor, 1985) . Since I will not distinguish between semiperiphery and periphery, I follow the convention of using noncore to include both semiperiphery and periphery. The second of these types is the early incorporation of countries, such as China and India, that had well-developed internal markets but whose economies were not fundamentally restructured by incorporation into the world system. In both these countries, internally generated economic changes were slow and colonialism, or in the case of China, neocolonialism brought no radically new sets of social and economic relationships (Raza et al., 1981; Skinner, 1977) . Both the rates and levels of urbanization are low.
The experiences associated with the third type, those fitting the countries of North Africa, are similar since they, too, were incorporated early and without fundamental restructuring, and rates of urbanization are low. The contrast with China and India is that, lacking large internal markets, countries of this type have been heavily dependent on external trade, resulting in moderately high levels of urbanization, associated with an old urban culture (Abu-Lughod, 1980:30-51).
The fourth type is of relatively early incorporation, with uneven restructuring, resulting in "islands" of export agriculture or mining amidst subsistence cultivation. The fifth type also shows high rates of urbanization. It is the most recent form of incorporation into the world system-that associated with the political economy of the cold war. These are the "new" Asian countries, of which South Korea is the example in Table I , that became significant locations of foreign investment in the 1950s and 1960s. Their rapid transformation is closely linked to two phenomena: considerable economic and military aid and their proximity to Japan, as the latter seeks markets and outlets for investment (Nemeth and Smith, 1985:197-204; Deyo, 1986) .
The consequences of different development histories reach beyond the demographic components of contemporary urbanization. Types of historical experience are also significant in forming the social actors in urban development. As Henderson (1986) argues, it is the nature of the state and the balance of social forces within it that, in practice, mediate the impact of the world system on urban development. Noncore countries vary widely in the developmental priorities of their governments with respect, for instance, to housing and urban welfare provision, partly because of variations in the relative strength of the various class groupings that affect these priorities.
Two variables are crucial, and I introduce them to indicate the need to further differentiate the types outlined above. One is the centralization of the state and its capacity to administer its territory in the face of centrifugal forces, such as regionalism. The other is the strength of the "challenge" that the state faces from the emerging urban classes-the working class and also the middle class.
The contrast between Latin America and South Korea is instructive in this respect. The Latin American states have been independent nations for over a century but centrifugal forces, generated by regionally based economic interest, have been strong, although that strength varies considerably from country to country. South Korea, in contrast, was born as a highly centralized state inheriting the traditions of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy, and because of an early and radical agrarian reform that destroyed regional agrarian elites, had weak centrifugal forces with which to contend (Kang, 1989) . The challenge that the Latin American states have faced from the urban classes, however, has been stronger than in the case of South Korea. Most Latin American countries acquired substantial urban populations earlier than did South Korea, and in some, such as Argentina and Brazil, industrialization had already massed workers in urban factories by the 1940s (Roberts, 1978: chap. 3).
South Korea industrialized later, with substantial rural to urban migration. The urban classes in South Korea, then, are more "immature" than those of most Latin American countries. In face of a strong state, they have, until recently, been unable to organize to obtain better conditions of work and pay (Deyo, 1986). In contrast, in most Latin American countries, labor has played a major role politically and the state has, although to different degrees, coopted the various urban classes through subsidies, union organization, and welfare provision. Pearson (1986) points out that this difference between Latin America and the industrial "tigers" of Asia helps explain why Latin American countries, with some exceptions, are not chosen as sites for export assembly industry based on cheap and usually feminine labor.
The shaping of current responses by the different types of historical experience is by no means determined, since the limits set on state and class formation are broad ones and other factors, such as natural resources and size of a country, need to be considered. All these countries are part, however, of the same world system and it is to the exploration of the present logic of that system that I now turn.
THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND URBANIZATION
Various studies have shown the implications of the current transformation in the world system for urbanization at the core (Noyelle and Stanback, 1984; Sassen-Koob, 1985; Hill, 1986; Hill and Feagin, 1987; Feagin, 1988 Some studies of urbanization in noncore countries have also looked at how the world system and its processes affect the urban hierarchies and internal urban processes of individual countries (London, 1980; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Nemeth and Smith, 1985) . The major focus, however, has been on cross-national comparisons. Variables associated with noncore position, such as degree of multinational penetration, have been shown to correlate positively with rapid urban growth and with employment concentration in the tertiary sector, and negatively with economic growth (London, 1987; London and Smith, 1988; Bradshaw, 1987) . In these studies, the impact of external economic dependency is shown, following Lipton (1977) , to affect urbanization and development mainly through intermediate, internal processes. These include patterns of investment that disrupt the agrarian structure, resulting in "urban bias" and producing an overinflated tertiary sector.
Useful as these studies are, they need to take into account the shift in the world system context produced by the ending of the ISI phase and the emergence of the new phase of economic liberalism. The economic dependency associated with the ISI period is different in one essential respect from that of the present period. ISI created economic dependency through the investments of multinationals and the use of imported technology, but it was inward looking and aimed basically at the development and exploitation of the internal market. This difference between an economic dependency based on internal and fragmented markets and the current one based on integrated world markets has significant implications for the key actors in urbanization.
In the ISI period, the state, because of the relative weakness of local capital, becomes an active agent in urban development by taking a major role in creating economic infrastructure. Urban bias is likely to be strongest in the ISI phase. Urban bias created the basis for the populist coalitions between state, the urban classes, and industrial capital, whether foreign or local. The urban middle and working classes were junior partners in these coalitions, but compared to the rural population, they received substantial benefits in health and educational services and through food and other subsidies. States in different countries handled these issues in widely differing ways, and the effective participation of the new urban classes varied widely also, as shown by the contrast between the relative strength and independence of trade unions in Argentina, for example, with their subordination in Brazil (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969:120-121). State employment grew rapidly as a proportion of all nonagricultural employment and it was concentrated in the major cities of the periphery, with state employees often being privileged contractually and through welfare benefits.
The current period begins a significant change in the role of the state at the periphery. Less able to attract private or government loans from core countries and under pressure from international financial organizations to reduce public spending, peripheral states retrench employment and move to liberalize internal markets, reducing tariffs on imports, privatizing stateowned companies and reducing restrictions on foreign investment. The private sector, although less capable of taking an independent political stance than in the core because of the weakness of domestic capital and the strength of foreign capital, gains greater independent power. In the ISI period, domestic capital often allied with foreign multinationals, supplying them with goods and services, and both benefited from state intervention and from the expansion of the internal market (Evans, 1979). In the export phase, the possibilities of cooperation are potentially greater since, in alliance with foreign capital, a domestic entrepreneur can penetrate markets in the core as well as internal ones. The state remains important to these developments, providing the incentives to foreign investment and ensuring that the social and economic environment encourages private initiative, through deregulating labor and reducing government expenditures.
Citizens continue, as in the ISI period, to play a much greater role in shaping urban space than they do in core countries. Much of the housing and basic urban amenities are secured by self-help and reciprocity, and not by state and market. The relationship between the state (and whoever controls it) and the citizenry becomes, however, potentially more conflict ridden as urban subsidies are reduced, and both the welfare and employment roles of the state are attenuated (Walton and Ragin, 1989) .
In the following sections, I look in greater detail at the implications of this change for urbanization in the context of the world system, beginning with its consequences for spatial restructuring.
URBAN DIVERSIFICATION
One of the major likely consequences of the new order, as Portes (1989) In South Korea, in contrast, where the ISI phase was brief and development has been led by export industrialization, the urban hierarchy is much flatter, with Seoul's predominance offset by the steady growth of specialized industrial cities (Kang, 1989) .
This broadening of the urban hierarchy is both encouraged by and encourages the new international division of labor. Many noncore countries now have a range of cities with sufficient population and adequate infrastructure to support export industrialization. Since the new industries do not serve the internal market, they often locate away from the existing major cities, seeking export points, whether ports or borders, or "green field" sites. Other cities grow as service centers for agriculatural export zones and some, such as Hermosillo in Mexico, combine both service and export manufacturing functions.
The existing metropolitan centers specialize as centers for regional corporate headquarters and for producer services of various kinds. For example, in the two major cities of Brazil-Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro-employment generated by these services showed the fastest rates of growth of any sector, rising from approximately 4.9% of total nonagricultural employment in 1960 to 8.3% in 1980.4 Similar tendencies are present in Mexico City and Buenos Aires (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989) . The relative location of manufacturing jobs also changes, so that, for instance, the concentration of industrial employment in Mexico City declined by 1980 while the concentration of producer service employment increased.
There are significant differences, however, with the urban restructuring of core countries. First the forces making for restructuring, such as investment capital looking for high returns, are weaker. Although cities in noncore countries are subject to a speculative urban renewal similar to that occurring in Houston or Los Angeles, the impact of this renewal is feebler, leaving many central low-income neighborhoods undisturbed and others half reconstructed (Batley, 1983). Second, regional development is more uneven than in core countries. There are likely to be severe limits to the role that manufacturing exports can play in promoting growth, due to competition between noncore countries and to protectionism at the core (Marshall, 1989) . Export-oriented industry, even in countries such as Mexico that are heavily involved in such industrialization, often accounts for a minority of employment and stimulates the development of a relatively small number of cities.
In this situation, there is some indication of another type of urban specialization -that of cities that provide a basic subsistence for their inhabitants through income opportunities in small-scale, craft-type manufacturing, and in traditional services such as commerce, domestic service, and other personal services. These cities serve as places of refuge for a rural and small town population for whom the agrarian structure no longer provides sufficient income opportunities for household subsistence. An example is the contrast between the northern Brazilian city of Fortaleza, in which, in 1980, 41 %o of employment was informal, concentrating in traditional services, craft workshops, and domestic service, and Sao Paulo, in which informal employment was only 20%o of the total (Telles, 1988: Table 2.4). (1989) , with Portes's (1989) subsequent reevaluation which emphasizes the heterogeneity of responses-in some cities polarization and in others less segregation. Thus, within countries, the pattern of regional development becomes both more uneven and more heterogeneous. The predominant contrast of the ISI period-that between dynamic metropolitan centers and stagnant small towns and villages-is less marked.
The main contrasts now are between types of cities and the income and living opportunities they offer. This is an important factor in the increasing predominance of interurban migration discussed later. It is also likely to diversify the bases for urban politics further. Populations, as I will suggest in a later section, may now be increasingly politically mobilized by the fact of urban residence and the austerity conditions imposed by the new international order. Their politics, however, are likely to be differentiated by urban conditions.
A final implication of current spatial restructuring is that there is likely to be a growing divergence in the patterns of urbanization between noncore countries. ISI promoted a certain convergence in urbanization: some countries followed the pattern earlier and some later, some at high levels and some at relatively low levels, but the emerging shape of the urban system was similar as were the problems associated with the cities-whether massive squatter settlements or widespread informal economic activities. By contrast, countries can be left out of the new order if they are not sufficiently attractive locations for foreign investment, thus resulting in divergence from those that have found their niches.
Within Latin America, for example, Mexico is securely incorporated into the new order because of its proximity to the United States, its range of natural and human resources, and its institutional stability. There seems little possibility that Peru can find a similar place in the new world order, despite its long history of incorporation in the old, gained through exporting primary products and through ISI.
The comparison of recent patterns of urbanization in both countries shows some of the consequences of this divergence. In Mexico, the degree of urban population concentration in the major agglomerations declined from 1970 to 1980, but in Peru this concentration continued to increase so that by 1980, Peru had 41.1%0 of its urban population in Lima-Callao (Oliveira and Roberts, 1989: Table 2 ). Nonagricultural employment in Peru has become increasingly divided between informal jobs (35.9%) and low-paid state employment (approximately 18%)-a large parasitic bureaucracy maintained, as De Soto (1987) would put it, on the backs of small-scale entrepreneurs. Blue-collar work in manufacturing in Peru accounts for only 10.4% of the nonagricultural population. In Mexico, employment is less concentrated in informal occupations (28.5%); has a larger sector of blue-collar employment in manufacturing (14.5%); and has a large proportion of private sector jobs in professional, technical, and managerial occupations.
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF MIGRATION
One of the major implications of the new order is high rates of population mobility, now taking place over larger distances. The increasing economic integration of the world system is likely, as we have seen, to accentuate the volatility of local economies, creating both labor shortages and labor abundance as some places stagnate and other prosper. The effects, as SassenKoob (1988) notes, are global. There is a demand in the world cities of the core for low-paid labor in the services that, in the absence of a local supply, is met by international migration, whereas the industries "exported" to noncore countries, located in new sites, promote internal migration. These tendencies are strengthened by the relative cheapening of transport costs and by improvements in communications that rapidly diffuse information about job opportunities nationally and internationally.
Political boundaries limit these movements, but as Mexican migration to the U.S. attests, these are rarely decisive and have little effect on movement when there is a demand for workers on the other side of the border (Bustamante and Martinez, 1979). The overall consequence is to undermine local labor markets and replace them by interlinked labor markets of regional and international scope, accentuating the drain of skills from noncore areas as in the case of the "brain drain" to the United States from Latin America and elsewhere (Portes, 1976 The novelty of these changes needs to be qualified, especially in relation to international migration. Massey (1988) The conditions for the displacement of the rural population of noncore countries were created during the years of ISI and its urban bias when, as a consequence of highly distorted agricultural policies, the economic basis of peasant agriculture was largely destroyed. There is, however, a major contrast in the direction of internal migration between the present period and that of ISI. Migration during the ISI period is predominantly rural-urban migration-a flow of people from villages and small towns to the large cities. In contrast, under the new order, urban to urban migration predominates, partly because of urban diversity and the volatility of urban economies, and partly because the increase in the proportion of the urban population inevitably leads to a decline in the relative importance of rural to urban migration. Urban to rural migration is another pattern likely to be characteristic of the new order. An example is the case of Chile, where unemployed urban workers seek jobs in harvesting or packing in the fruit exporting zones of the Central Valley (Rodriguez, 1987:336-341) .
This change in the pattern of migration will have significant effects for urban social organization. During ISI, migration was a key factor in the growth of cities since the large cities attracted migrants from other smaller urban places as well as from rural ones (Abu- Lughod, 1971 Lughod, , 1980 Misra, 1981) . This was also the case of highly urbanized countries such as Argentina in the decade 1960-1970, when net migration accounted for 53.1% of the growth of the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires (Lattes, 1974) . The importance of rural-urban migration to the demography and culture of the large cities in the ISI period is demonstrated by the range of studies concentrating on migrant adaptation to urban life (Butterworth and Chance, 1981). These studies report how people move from villages and small towns to the large cities, using family and village relationships to help each other find work and lodging (Kemper, 1977) . These relationships also become the basis for strong neighborhood and ethnic solidarities within the cities.
The pattern of migration in the contemporary perod is less likely to reinforce communal solidarities. Urban to urban migration in noncore countries adds to the instabilities of urban life, accentuating competition for jobs and living space. 
CHANGES IN LABOR MARKETS
The major change in the present period is a global one that is affected in its incidence by the spatial restructuring described above-the casualization of labor in both core and noncore countries (Portes and Sassen- Koob, 1987; Standing, 1988 Standing, , 1989 Roberts, 1989a) . Although this process is facilitated by changes in the technical bases of production, it is a direct result of policies of economic liberalism that have led to a worldwide deregulation of labor. The aim has been to lower costs and increase competitiveness among core countries, between core and noncore countries, and among noncore countries. A key element in this casualization is increasing feminization of labor in manufacturing as well as in the services. Female economic activity rates have increased substantially in most noncore countries in the 1980s, so that women make up a third or more of the urban labor force, whereas male activity rates have declined (Standing, 1989: Table 1 ). This female labor supply is heavily concentrated in low-paid, semiskilled work in manufacturing; in self-employment; and in low-paid, nonmanual sales and clerical work.
The major exceptions to this pattern are those Asian countries-South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-that, as was noted above, industrialized on the basis of exports. South Korea, for example, has approximately 35% of its urban labor force in manufacturing, mainly concentrated in large firms, although 3907 of these jobs are held by women and are mostly short term (Deyo, 1986).
The The impact of these occupational changes and of rising real incomes was to raise the levels of aspiration for housing and other consumer goods among the urban population (Durston, 1986). In contrast with the ISI period, the present one has seen a sharp curtailment of these aspirations, and a significant lowering in the possibilities of occupational mobility. The changes affect most sharply the newly entering cohorts into the labor market and these are likely to be made up increasingly of the urban-born (Durston, 1986).
The change in mobility opportunities can be illustrated by the case of Argentina, a noncore country with a long experience of incorporation in the world economy. The industrial working class of Buenos Aires has been constituted by separate layers, the first embodying the European-born migrants who found work in craft industry in the early years of this century while the second was largely composed of internal migrants. These came mainly from the small towns of the Pampas area who moved in large numbers to Buenos Aires in the 1940s as Argentina began a rapid period of ISI. The standard of living of this urban working class was, as Marshall (1981) shows, maintained by state intervention in terms of rent control and food subsidies. In the late 1970s, when Argentina began to promote export industrialization, these subsidies were withdrawn. This withdrawal, together with the declining performance of the Argentine economy, led to substantial declines in real wages for the established urban working class and for many nonmanual workers, especially those in state employment (Marshall, 1989) . In the 1970s, migrants to Buenos Aires from Bolivia, Paraguay, and from the interior of Argentina concentrated in poorer paid and more casual forms of employment (Marshall, 1978:122-130) . Similar changes over time in the relation between migration and employment have been reported for Mexico City (Nufioz  et al., 1982) .
In the present period, not only are there fewer opportunities for social mobility, but there is a reversal of the decline in self-and family employment (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Marshall, 1987) . Indeed, if unemployment and unprotected workers are added to these categories, the increase in "informal" employment becomes sharp by the late 1980s (Portes, 1989) . This reversal represents, in certain respects, a return to the situation in which earning a livelihood depends on family and community relationships, and marks the end to, or at least a halt in, the move to the full proletarianization of the labor force. There are indications that income distribution worsens with these trends (Mertens and Richards, 1987) . The growth of intermediatepaying jobs in manufacturing slackens, and that of low-paying casual jobs increases, while upper income groups benefit from high returns on investments at home and abroad.
These trends entail, I argue, a change in the operation of the "informal economy." In the ISI period, cheap labor subsidized the dynamic sectors of the economy, sometimes directly as in the case of subcontracting, but more often indirectly, as when the provision of cheap goods and services, including self-constructed housing, enabled workers in the dynamic sectors to maintain a respectable standard of living on wages that were low compared with those of comparable workers in the core (Portes and Walton, 1981: chap. 3). The expansion of informal enterprises was closely related to the expansion of formal ones; profits, pay, and conditions of work improved in the informal sector in line with the expansion of the formal sector.
This type of linkage is less likely in the present situation. First, there is less emphasis on the internal market of noncore countries as a source of growth. Austerity policies mean, in effect, reducing local consumption as a means of increasing export earnings and improving the balance of trade. Free trade policies bring in a flood of cheaply manufactured goods from countries where labor is cheaper and organized more productively. These goods such as shoes, textiles, and cheap utensils compete directly with those produced by informal workshops. Second, urban bias is replaced by antiur-ban bias, with dramatic rises in the cost of urban services and of basic foodstuffs as subsidies are withdrawn.
In this situation, open unemployment rises (Portes, 1989) . Also, labor deregulation weakens the dualism between protected and unprotected sectors of the labor market, placing most workers in the same unprotected situation. This reduces one of the "advantages" that gave the informal economy part of its dynamism. The reduction in real incomes, including those of substantial sectors of the new urban middle classes, means that there are likely to be fewer purchasers of the cheap goods and services that the informal economy provides.
In the ISI period, the informal economy was an alternative, and at times a more flexible and higher paying alternative to formal sector employment allowing people to maximize the economic usefulness of household and community relationships (Roberts, 1989b ). In the new order, the informal economy loses its social as well as its economic dynamic. It becomes a generalized and basic means of survival in the absence of state welfare payments.
Occupational diversity and polarization are, then, the likely outcomes in noncore countries of contemporary trends in urban labor markets: a "modern" middle class based on state employment and producer services, itself differentiated by greater susceptiblity of those in state employment to economic retrenchment and lower real wages; and a working class occupying a range of occupational niches, ranging from a consolidated but small industrial working class, to a mass of informalized workers in small-scale employment or self-employment.
URBAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
It is these changes in context-spatial restructuring, new patterns of migration, and labor markets-that make the basic difference in the present period in the ways in which people act individually and collectively in the cities of noncore countries. Throughout the developing world people have shown considerable energy and ingenuity in making the most they can of economies that, even when they were expanding, offered low wages, limited shelter, and few amenities. Even when the state provided some welfare, this welfare rarely extended beyond food and transport subsidies and pensions for key groups of workers. During ISI, as in the present period of austerity, family and community networks served as a frequent substitute for stateprovided welfare, providing help in emergencies and pooling resources to obtain housing, employment, or to generate small business.
The strategies that households employ to get by in the cities of the developing world, based mainly on the intensive use of household and community relationships, are well documented (Lomnitz, 1977) . They differ little from those used during industrialization in Europe, and are affected by similar variables, such as type of work and main sources of income (Tilly and Scott, 1978; Anderson, 1971 ).
Tilly and Scott (1978:64-79) argue that it is not urbanization nor even factory employment per se that makes the basic difference to household organization, but the general changes in context created by proletarianization and the increase in opportunities to earn wages and to spend them. It is these changes that lead to the family economy of the early industrial period being replaced by the family wage economy, and finally, by the family consumer economy, altering the expectations attached to the different family roles. This approach can usefully be applied to understanding the effects on urban family organization of contemporary contexts. It is differences in the sets of income opportunities and expenditures and what these mean for family roles that Mingione (1987a Mingione ( , 1987b In this new context, the importance of family and community networks generates more severe contradictory pressures than in the past. As in the ISI period, economic difficulties and the use of family and community relationships in overcoming these strengthen relationships. Household members need to pool resources. Community networks are fortified through a variety of cooperative endeavors such as soup kitchens, housing cooperatives, and neighborhood defense associations. In the absence of formal means of securing advice or loans, informal means prevail, grounded on whatever basis of trust is available, whether kinship, common religion, or common ethnic or regional origin.
In the difficult economic climate of the present period, greater strains are placed on these community relationships, as Tironi (1987) reports for Santiago, Chile. There is evident tension within households, as husbands demand that wives fulfill their domestic chores and take in work for pay. Although members of the household pool resources, the pooling is often perceived inequitable, with women providing more of their income than men and the young feeling they have a right to a greater share of theirs for their personal needs. There is some evidence that women are better off alone with their children than when husbands are also present (Chant, 1985) . At the community level, the economic pressures fragment as well as unify. Households work long hours with little time to give to community affairs, and their members have jobs different from those of their neighbors.
The situation is made more complex by the decreasing salience of workbased identities and careers for much of the urban population of noncore countries. The practices of employers, as well as the strategies of workers, mean that only a minority of workers pursue a stable job career. Instead, a typical pattern is for the young male or female to begin working for pay in informal activities of various kinds-homework, as "apprentices" in small workshops, or helping sell goods in the street. From this, they often move on to a job in a formal enterprise when they are still unmarried -the women in textile factories or modern assembly plants, and the men in other branches of manufacturing. With marriage and children the women will cease formal work, and, if they work for pay, will do it at home or in occasional domestic service. As the men grow older, they choose, or are forced, to leave their jobs in large-scale enterprise and take up some form of self-employment.
We saw earlier that the urban economies of noncore countries have a very high percentage of their employment opportunities in informal work. The proportion of the economically active people who pass through such jobs in the course of a working career is much greater than what these percentages suggest. In this situation, work identity and commitment are unlikely to develop -either with a firm and fellow workers or with a particular work skill. What matters is the nature of the income opportunity, such as the flexibility in hours or earning capacity it provides and the degree of social security protection it affords.
The significance of work as a source of social identity is increasingly being replaced by other forms of identity. In Latin America, religion has been important during urbanization and remains strong in the contemporary period, as shown by the continuing growth of sects, such as the Pentecostals or by the success of the Catholic comunidades de base (grass-roots commu-nities). Gender is also becoming a more salient source of identity for participation in the wider society. There is an increasing and self-aware participation of women in neighborhood and wider political organization (Moser and Peake, 1987). The numbers of women in the work force throughout the developing world have also increased dramatically, both in white-collar occupations and in manual work in industry and in the services. Along with this increase, there is some evidence of women exercising more say in household budgeting than before. Generation is also an evident public identity, differentiating the interests of the young from the old. Distinct youth cultures have become important factors in politics in noncore countries (Vila, 1989) .
The weakness of work-based identities and the emergence of others that have a less coherent relation to class allegiances affect urban social movements in noncore countries. Even in those countries with the highest levels of urbanization, the class basis for popular organization and association is weak. It is hardly any stronger for the middle classes. Population mobility and economic instability have prevented, with few exceptions, the formation of strong work-based associations, such as trade unions or professional associations. There is, indeed, little associative tradition at all in the cities of the developing world beyond that provided by community allegiances.
In this context, urban political movements have been sporadic and ephemeral, often coalescing around urban issues such as the takeover of public land for housing or neighborhood betterment. The main enemy is often the state through its failure to provide adequate housing and other urban infrastructure. Everyday urban issues become a source of politicization, but the nature of the confrontation also makes it an unlikely enduring basis for political organization (Schuurman and Van Naerssen, 1989). Urban protests wane over time in the face of repression as neighborhoods conflict over particular interests or as some participants are bought off with government favors. It is the insubstantial nature of these protest movements that leads Touraine (1987) to characterize urban Latin America as lacking genuine social movements.
Indeed much of the urban communal energy tends to be directed away from formal politics and inward toward attempts at creating self-sufficient entities. Friedmann (1989) sees the barrio movement in Latin America in these terms, as an attempt to substitute both the market and the state by providing communal services such as soup kitchens and emphasizing reciprocity as a means of survival.
There is a difference, however, between the urban popular struggles of the ISI phase and those likely to intensify in the new period. In ISI, both migrants and natives faced the substantial challenge of creating housing for themselves in cities where the deficit deprived over half the population of adequate shelter (Garza and Schteingrat, 1978) . Their struggles became a fac-tor in politics, influencing government policies and at times, as in the case of Peru, bringing governments down (Collier, 1976; Castells, 1983:190-209 ). Yet the struggle for shelter occurred in a context where, as noted above, the opportunities for job mobility were reasonably good-rural migrants secured stable jobs in manufacturing industry, and urban natives entered nonmanual and state employment in large numbers. This is one of the bases for the lack of fit between spatial marginality and occupational marginality in Latin American cities that Castells (1983:181) noted; squatter settlements housed a wide variety of manual and nonmanual workers. In this situation, the long-term effectiveness of urban struggles as a distinctive basis for political action was limited by two main factors. First was the desire and ability of those living in marginal settlements to upgrade their housing and to secure amenities to make themselves a regular part of the city (Castells, 1983:201-204) . This goal, it should be remembered, had a basis in the rising real family incomes in the 1960s and 1970s. Second was state policies of co-optation defusing neighborhood militancy by selectively granting favors and providing basic resources often, as in the case of land regularization, at little cost to the state (Cornelius, 1975; Ward, 1986) .
The current pattern of development makes such diffusion less easy. Most urban populations are now native to the city. They are no longer "making" the city, and their real incomes and their possibilities for mobility are declining. Similarly, the state no longer has the same capacity to co-opt, partly because of austerity and lack of resources, partly because the "easy" forms of co-optation are disappearing. State-owned land has been used up, and the new land invasions increasingly infringe on privately owned property. Contemporary urban social movements may be less ideological than in the past, but they are likely to be more pragmatic and persistent (Palma, 1989) .
Thus the effects of the various urban struggles on political change and organization are likely to intensify. Although the urban milieus of the developing world do not provide the conditions for the type of class-based politics that developed as Europe urbanized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there is a clear extension of citizenship occurring with urban development. Public participation is constantly being provoked by the everyday struggle to make a living. The size of the cities and the density of urban life make it more difficult for elites to control political activity from above. There are also a large number of nongovernmental organizations, often religious and often financed from abroad, that are devoted to engendering participation and self-help among urban inhabitants, especially the poor.
What this immense amount of local-level political activity in these cities is doing is to vindicate basic rights and to institutionalize political participation. This is not to argue that democracy and the new stage in urbanization go hand in hand, but it suggests certain limits on authoritarian rule.
CONCLUSION
The present period of extended "crisis" for noncore countries also brings significant changes in the pattern of their urbanization. Cities are no longer the privileged beneficiaries of development, as austerity and the policies associated with it raise the social and economic costs of urban living. These negative consequences may create, however, a certain space for alternative forms of development, as governments and populations encounter the diseconomies of concentration, and may take more seriously than in the past the need for a balanced regional development.
Present trends do not, however, augur well for such a development. Intermediate cities are emerging, broadening the urban system, but their economic dynamic often depends on fragile links to the world economy. Others are simply places of refuge for an impoverished rural population, allowing them to gain a bare subsistence denied to them in the areas from which they came. There are few urban growth poles, with strong backward and forward linkages into the national economy.
Cities, including intermediate ones, are likely to be more socially and economically volatile than in the past. Closer links to the world economy and its cycles are factors in this volatility. So, too, are the erosion of some of the bases for social solidarity such as common rural origin that created a certain stability during rapid urban growth. Perhaps most significant of all is the collapse of the safety valve provided by both the sense and the reality of upward social mobility.
In this context, politics becomes less organized. Populist and corporate strategies are less feasible and less to the taste of those in power. Also, some of the bases of organized politics such as trade unions are weakened as their membership relatively declines and work identities are themselves eroded. The weakening of organized politics makes possible a wider political participation, and political groups based on a broad range of issues-neighborhood, gender, environment. Reaching most urban inhabitants, these issues ensure a potential for mobilization greater than hitherto. The bases for this mobilization are not permanent, however, thus adding to urban volatility.
Welfare issues are urgent. The crisis brings worsening poverty to the cities of the developing world and reduces state-provided welfare. This is happening at a time when the household and community basis for caring is eroded by divisive pressures. The withdrawal of the state, in its welfare and planning functions, though not in its control functions, underlines its continuing importance to equitable development in the Third World. Both from conservative and radical political perspectives, the state is often seen as the enemy of development, stifling the growth of enterprise or standing in the way of community development and self-empowerment. The reality is that, in Latin America at least, there never has been an effective welfare-oriented state, and its presence is needed to ensure an effective regional development and adequate levels of urban welfare.
These conclusions are speculatively meant to suggest a research agenda concerned with the social basis of political and economic change in the developing world. Two strategies are called for. One is comparative research that takes the global context into account. The urbanization experiences of noncore countries are diverse, yet they are also unified by the part they play in the world system. Comparison enables us to avoid premature generalization on the basis of a regional or national context, and illuminates what is specific about particular cases. We also need longitudinal research comparing, for instance, urban social organization in the 1960s and 1970s with the present. This historical perspective may help us to separate the ephemeral from the more permanent effects of the present urban crisis.
